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TRADE REGULATIONS
UNFAIR COMPETITION-USE OF A TRADE NAME BY A
NON-COMPETITOR
Defendant manufacturer sold a cereal food called "Life of
WIheat." Plaintiff, publisher of the magazine "Life," sought in-
junctive relief on the grounds of trade-mark infringement and un-
fair competition. Held, that the defendant's use of the label with
format and color combination similar to plaintiff's trade-mark was
not an infringement because the two products were not in the same
class; and that the public would not infer that the magazine was the
sponsor of the cereal. Time, Inc., v. Viobin Corp., 40 F. Supp. 249
(E. D. I1. 1941).
Defendant Horlick used his own name in the manufacture of dog
food. Plaintiff corporation, manufacturer of malted milk products
under the same trade-name, sought injunctive relief. On defend-
ant's motion to dismiss, held, denied on the theory that the products
were colorablv the same and the public would confuse them. Hor-
lick's Malted Milk Corp. v. Horlick et al., 40 F. Supp. 501 (E. D.
Wis. 1941).
Simulation of trade-marks and trade-names in an effort to ad-
vance the sales of non-competitive products or services has reached
extensive proportions. The experience of the magazine "Esquire" is
revealing. Use of this popularized name has run the gamut from
men's suits, razors, belts, and shoe laces to night clubs, foods, barber
shops, ice cream, and brassieres. Aside from extensive court litiga-
tion, the publishing company has in more than four hundred indi-
vidual instances conducted negotiations resulting in the dropping of
the name.' Those affected by such commercial tactics advance
arguments that go to the following points: injury to reputation be-
cause of the association of their goods with the inferior goods of the
"infringers," the customers buying the latters' goods transferring
their dislike to the plaintiffs' products wherever dissatisfied ;2 loss
of potential customers prejudiced against the infringers' products
where plaintiffs enter upon business in those other fields,8 destruc-
tion of the customer association of plaintiffs' goods with plaintiffs
I Printer's Ink, June 20, 1941.
2 Ilorlick's Malted Mill Corp. r. Horlick ct al., 40 F. Supp. S01 (F. D. Wis. 1941).
cited s,.pra in text.
2 Beechnut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co. 273 V. S. 629 (1927)
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because of the tendency to gradually whittle away or disperse the
identity of the product and its hold on the public mind ;4 lessening
of ability to compete because of the diminution in the drawing power
of their marks."
In carrying their case to the courts, however, those claiming the
right to relief from this newer form of commercial practice have
been put to it to justify their appeal for judicial aid. The original
equitable doctrine of unfair competition arose from the taking of a
man's property, in the form of sales, by appropriating his name and
inducing the public by deceit to purchase defendant's goods in the
belief that they were the plaintiffs'. The essence of the wrong, then.
lying in the deceitful palming off of one's goods as the merchandise
of another, a showing of actual competition became a rigid require-
ment for injunctive relief because passing off could take place only
in a competitive matrix. This limited application of the doctrine
was expressed in the Borden case where the court indicated that the
defendant could make anything that the plaintiff had not made.6
Faced with this dilemma the courts developed the "related goods"
doctrine as a ground for allowing injunctive relief in the non-com-
petitive cases; if the defendant's product was closely related to the
plaintiff's there would be infringement or unfair competition because
the public would be confused as to the source. Many ridiculous re-
sults made their way into the books as a consequence of judicial at-
tempts to stretch the nature of a defendant's goods to a point where
they "related" to the plaintiff's product.7  Other courts came to
abandon the effort at relating products, extending the doctrine of
equitable protection to non-competitive as fully as to competitive
situations.
The upshot of this judicial evolution is that today finds a distinct
trend toward the allowance of relief from this newer type of trade-
name piracy. s The Harlick case carries this trend to its final impli-
Esquire Inc. v. Esquire Bar, 37 F. Supp. 875 (App. D. C. 1941).
'ibid.
'Borden Ice Crcam Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 310 (C. C. A.
7th, 1912).
rOates, Relief in Equity Against Unfair Trade Practices of Non.competitors, 01931)
25 ILL. L. Rev. 643; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 Rep. Pat. Cas.
110; Wall v. Ros-Royce Automobile Co., 4 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 3rd 1925).
8For a complete history of the development of non-compcting infringement rule- s-
Oates, supra note 7; Lukens, Applications cof Principles of Unfair Competition (1927)
75 U. oF I'A. L. REv. 197; HAUNDLER, CASEs AD xT-EtALs O, TrADr REGULATIO-S, (1937)
698-701; Notes (1940) 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rzv. 304; (1939) 7 Gro. W\:s. L. REv. 869:
time, Inc., v. Barshay, 27 F. Stup. 870 (S. D. N .Y. 1939).
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cations by disqualifying the noncompetitive use of a personal name. '
Clearly against the main flow of decision, Time, Inc., v. Viobin Corp.
insists upon more tangible evidence of injury to plaintiff's interests.
Such a judicial attitude is to be commended; courts have been too
quick to accept contentions based not upon analytical fact but upon
subjective opinion. It must be remembered that as between the par-
ties there is no commodity competition. When there is no competi-
tion, confusion is more the exception than the rule because parties
making different products will clearly be distinguished in the con-
sumer's mind.", Disproof of confusion collapses the argument that
simulation causes an "affective transfer" of dislike; a customer
cannot transfer a dislike to a product that he does not associate with
the offending product. At the very least, therefore, the plaintiffs in
these cases should bear a definite burden of proof to verify their
claims to injury, save in those instances where the products of the
litigants compete in a "substituted" sense. Even more forthright
would be a judicial determination either to bring such cases within
the periphery of the law by expanding Equity's old rule forbidding
trespass to reputation, for it is the unfairness of trading on an es-
tablished name that brings the cry for law's intervention, or to leave
legal redress to other interests. Only recently the Federal Trade
Commission has successfully acted against this very type of business
practice, in the name of both the public and those who actually suffer
unfair disadvantage in commodity competition with the offending
pirateer. 12 Enforcement of the concept of fair competition in the
use of trade names in unrelated lines might better be made through
the Commission and those adversely affected in a direct, competitive
sense.
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